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Introduction
nternational Standards for Mine Action are be
ing revised by the United Nations. As part of the
revision process, a working group on personal
protective equipment (WGPPE) has been established
to examine the subject of safe ty in mine clearance operations, and to make recommendations on standards
and guidelines for PPE. T his paper is based on the
WGPPE's report.
The concepts of safety, risk and risk management
are not new to humanitarian mine clearance. Risk
management involves the identification, analysis, assessment and removal (or at least reduction) of risk.
The term implies dominance and comrol of the risk,
and the application of agreed processes to achieve
consistent results.
It is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term
safe in respect to mine clearance. To say that a situation is safe implies a final judgement that the risk is
in some sense acceptable or tolerable, or even nonexistent. However, the terms "acceptable" and "tolerable" imply human judgement of the situation and
judgement may be tentative, transient and fallible.
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ASystems Approach to the Problem
A recent international study of mine accidents
and incidents carried our by Andy Smith on behalf
of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has revealed that in the vast majority of cases, victims either failed to wear PPE correctly or were engaged in

activities which con travened local Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). A simple statement of the blast
and ballistic protection levels alone would be inadequate for international safety standards. A systems
approach considering rhe threat, training, operating
procedures, supervision, equipment capabilities, environmental factors and protection levels is needed to
enable managers of mine clearance operations to decide appropriate local requirements for PPE.

Mine and UXO Threat
Though the term "threat" is not often found in
general safety literature, it is frequently used in mine
clearance to describe the extent of risk at a particular
time in a particular country, province or district. T hreat
is a useful concept and we must establish a common
understanding of its meaning and application.
Whereas "risk" refers to the probability and severity of a single occurrence of harm , the threat from
mines and UXO refers to the sum of local risks in an
area or theatre. In mine clearance, the probability of
harm is a combination of the quantity of munitions
with the potential to cause harm and rhe probability
of failing to detect a single active mine/UXO. T here
seem to be three components of any threat within a
given area: (1) The type of hazard (fragmentation, blast
or incendiary), and rhe severity of physical harm which
would result from irs unintended detonation; (2) T he
detecrability of mines and/or UXO; and (3) The quantity of mines and/or UXO within a given area.
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Threat is dependent on rime as well as area. In
some mine-affected theaters it will reduce over time
fro m demining and through effective mine awareness
training. In other theaters it may increase over rime
fro m uncontrolled vegetation coverage, so il movements and the cumulative effects of weather.
The threat can be demonstrated graphically as
shown in Table 1 below. T his example, which uses
data from Bosnia-Herzegovina, attempts to illustrate
the antipersonnel (AP) mine threat in Sector
MND(SW). In general, mines towards the top right
of the table represent a greater threat than those towards the bottom left. The size of rhe circle is proportional to the quantity of mines.

Risk Management
In recent years, the concepts of risk, risk manageme nt and safety h ave received much attention
from industry and academia. This attention can be
explained in part by a moral imperative and by a
growing sense of duty, bur it is mainly driven by the
impact ofl irigation. The International Organisation
fo r Standardisation (ISO) has had to address these
issues in the workplace. ISO guidel ines for the development of safety standards are relevant, and the
ISO approach has proved to be an appropriate model
to guide the work of the WGPPE.
Notwithstand ing the legal imperatives to reduce
risk, humanitarian mine clearance imposes a moral
duty of care that demands attention be given to the
consequence of all actions, and also to the co nsequence of inaction. The latter is often overlooked,
and is particularly relevant to those in positions of
authority, supervision or of professional standing in
humanitarian mine clearance.

Health and Safety
The International Labour Organisation (lLO)
is a specialist agency of the United Nations, which
seeks the promotion of human and labor rights. The
ILO formulates international standards in the form
of Co nventions and Recommendations by seuing
mini mum norms, including basic standards regulating conditions of work and the workplace. In 1981,
the ILO adopted a Convention (C l 55) and related
Reco mmendation (R164) o n Occupational Safety
and Health.
Precedent and norms already exist at international level to provide guidance for the developmenr
of new inrernational standards fo r safety in mine

clea rance. T he concept of responsibi lity included in
ISO and ILO documents implies the need for accountabili ty. In particular, rhe responsibilities and obligations of the national authorities, mine actio n centers, the employers and employees, as required by the
ILO, should be applied to the management of mine
clearance and be included in the revised safety standards.

Mine Incidents and Accidents
Risk reduction involves a combi nation of safe
operating procedures, education, training, effective
supervision and PPE. In adopting a systems approach,
the WGPPE considered it necessary to analyze and
evaluate the relationships berween these factors before decidi ng whether
AP mine threat,
the residual ris k to
MND(SW) Bosniademiners is "tolerable."
Herzegovina
Table 1
This conforms to the
approach taken by ISO
in d eveloping safety
Leas1
Delectable
standards.
Much
of the
WGPPE's analysis and
PROM-1
many of its conclusions
on PPE have been derived from the Database of Demining Incident Victims (D D IV)
co mpiled by Sm ith .
The database covers
Greatest
SEVERITY OF H AR ..
Least
mine clearance incidents in Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovi na, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
T he DDIV is a record of explosive incidents involving deminers. The victims were employed by
NGOs, commercial demining co m panies, national
agencies and, in some cases, the military. T he current
release (Version 1) of the database contains the records
of 319 victims and 249 incidents.
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Mine and UXO Hazards
AP blast mi nes are the most abundant mines
encountered in h uman itarian mine clearance and
cause the greatest number of injuries. At close quarters, AP fragmentatio n mines overmatch the PPE currently availab le. Due to the area effect of such mines,
they also have the potential to effect seco ndary victims. AT m ines normally req uire sign ificant pressure

------------------------------------------• 49.

to detonate and are less hazardous to manual deminers
unless employed in a non-conventional manner. Effective PPE against AT mines is nor available.
In general, when UXO munitions are encountered in mine clearance operations, they have already
malfunctioned, rho ugh some are specifically designed
as area denial weapons. They are usually high in metal
content, on or near the surface. Since most are easily
detectable, they constitute less of a hazard than mines.
When rhe threat from "advanced UXO" exists, specialist EOD teams should be used. The varied nature
ofUXO means that the hazard is best dealt with procedurally, rather than relying on PPE designed primarily for humanitarian mine clearance.
The effect of blast is roughly proportional to the
explosive content, though it can vary according to
the mine's construction. The PMN (240g) is an appropriate level to protect against, as it is one of the
most common mines found in reported incidents.
Most mines with larger charges (PROM-1, V69) are
fragmentation mines, and rhe lerhaliry of their fragmentation effects is more significant than blast.
Fragment sizes and velocities vary greatly, even
from mines of the same type with grooved/notched
casing. DDIV analysis shows a high percentage of
fatalities from fragmentation mines (52 percent of
bounding fragmentation mine incidents and 22 percent offragmentarion mine incidents); survivors were
usually secondary victims. Currem PPE levels do nor
protect against close proximity fragmentation mines
bur may protect secondary victims.
There is also a fragmentation hazard from rhe
casing and inner components of some AP blast mines.
Furthermore, AP blast mines buried in scree, gravel
roads and tracks and in soil comaining a high percentage of stones represent a particular challenge for PPE.

ing the mine during examination or disarming. Nearly
seven percem of incidents involved behavior considered dangerous or careless, such as stepping ourside a
cleared and well-marked area.
Only two percent of all incidents involved an
accident during detection. It should be noted, however, rhar this low figure may disguise the practice of
"detection by excavation," which is sometimes applied.

Areas of the Body at Risk
The DDIV classifies non-fatal injuries as severe
if rhey were likely to be life threatening, to require
surgery or to result in permanent disability. All other
injuries are classified as minor. The distinction is not
intended to reflect rhe suffering and/or hardship associated with any injury. The areas of the body at risk
are summarized in Table 2 below.
The risk of severe injuries to the head and to the
limbs (both upper and lower) is similar, but the risk
to rhe trunk is not as severe. The majority of head and
upper limb injuries were caused while excavating and
from (mis)handling incidents, whereas rhe majority
oflower limb injuries were caused by missed-mine incidents.
(Note: The lower number of injuries to rhe trunk
cannot be explained by rhe provision ofPPE since rhe
DDIV suggests that in rhe majority of cases the victims were not wearing any body protection).

Environment
The diversity of environmental factors make it
difficult to generalize about their impact on safety as
a whole and on PPE in particular. Climatic extremes
are a constant concern in some theaters through high
temperamre, humidity or cold. In addition, there may
be local environmental problems which demand use
of specialized PPE or life support equipment.

Harmful Activities
Areas of the Body at
Risk Table 2
Severe Minor

,_,

Headand neck:

94

148

Upper Limb:

92

142

Lower Limb:

109

98

The most common mine clearance activities which
led to harm were excavation (36 percent) and missedmine incidents (26 percent). Excavation includes digging with any tool or investigating a previously located mine; a missed-mine incident occurs when a victim initiates a deTotal
vice which the deminer or any other mem242
ber of the demining unit has failed to lo234
cate. While excavating, almost all
deminers were injured in rhe squatting or
207
kneeling position.
117
Less than 10 percent of incidents involved deminers (mis) handling or hold-

_____________________ _
Trunk:

40
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Analysis and Discussion
Perception(s): It is often assumed rhar minimum
metal mines represent the greatest risk to deminers,
as they are, at least in theory, the most difficult to
detect. However, this assumption is not confirmed by
the number of reported injuries. The majority of
missed mine incidents involve a PMN, PMN 2 or
PPM-2 and all have significant metal content. There
may be a psychological "risk adjustment," which
causes deminers to operate with greater caution in
areas where minimal metal mines are expected.
Fatalities: Incidents resulting in death show a
disproportionate number resulting from bounding
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fragmentation mines. AP blast mines account for the
next greatest number followed by larger mines. Vegetation clearance produced the highest number of
deminer fatalities. Handling or manipulating mines
(so me during rhe process of disarming) proved to be
the second highest readily identifiable activity at the
ri me of death.
Injuries: Evidence suggests that AP blast mines
were the most common cause of de miner injury (62
pe rcent) , of which the PMN and PMN-2 series
caused 38 percent of the incidents.
Protection: A fragmentation jacket or apron of
some kind was issued to under a third of the victims
recorded in the DDIV. Ir was worn in only half of
those cases, and visors were temporarily discarded or
raised by 56 percent of the victims issued with them.
T he thickest visors commonly worn were 5mm thick.
T hese appeared to provide adequate protection
against blast and were considered wearable by
deminers. There was also evidence of severe hand
injuries resulting (at least in part) fro m the use of
inappropr.iare hand-tools during manual demining.

Risk Reduction
Risk Management: Risk reduction involves a
combination offactors, including safe operating procedures, education, training, PPE and effective supervision. Though international guidelines and national SOPs can provide advice on how this can be
achieved, the responsibility for risk management lies
principally with the employers be they national
reams, demining NGOs or commercial contractors.
This responsibility must be embedded in the management culture and practices of all organizations
involved in the planning and prosecution of humanitarian mine clearance operations.
Control and supervision: There is much room
fo r improvement in the control and supervision of
h umanitarian mine clearance operations. Over 50
percent of the injuries recorded in the DDIV were
apparently caused by inadequate "field control." Improved field discipline and control through education, training and supervision would reduce rhe risk
to deminers. It would also increase the overall efficiency of clearance operations. An accident causes
substantial dislocation and delay in addition to the
obvious injuries to the victim and to the socio-economic impact on his family and community.
Reports and Investigations: T here is significant
variation in the quality and timeliness of reports and
post-incident investigations. Consideration should be

given ro the development of an international standard
for reponing and for the cond uct of investigations and
inquiries. Though local requiremenrs may vary, there
is a need to maintain objectivity and impartiality and
to facilitate lessons learned about risk and safety issues.

PPE Requirements
Human Factors: The frequency with which
deminers fail to wear PPE suggests that equipment
and clothing is either inappropriate or is already at
or beyond the "wearable" limits of weight and mobility, though some improvements could be achieved
through better field discipline. Any assessment of PPE
requirements must recognize th e limits of acceptability by addressing the human factors, including environmental conditions and ergonomics.
Associated Equipment: The systems approach to
risk reduction includes an understanding of the interface between rhe deminer and his/her associated
equipment. In this respect, rhe selection and use of
hand-protection and appropriate hand-tools is particularly important and should be considered as an
integral parr of the PPE requirement.
Blast: The explosive content of a PMN is" . .. just
under rhe threshold for overpressure injuries." Larger
explosive content is generally confined to fragmenrarion mines where the lerhali ty of fragmentation is more
significant than blast. The DDIV provides no evidence
to suggest the need to protect against overpressure
from AP blast mines, yet tests conducted by Canadian
Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) suggest rhe possibility in certain cases of" ... severe, critical or unsurvivable injury."
Fragmentation: Current accepted levels of PPE
provide inadequate protection against fragmentation
mines at close quarters, and procedures/processes
must be appl ied (with conviction) to reduce rhe risk
to a tolerable level. PPE should continue to be designed to protect "secondary victims" against fragmentation mines.
Boots: Blast-resistant boots which are designed
with at least a 1Ocm stand-off may reduce injuries
when stepping on small blast mines, but they impair
mobility and are unlikely to be accepted for general
use though they may have some specialist application.
There is no clear evidence to suggest that blast-resistant mine boots, without any stand-off, would reduce
injury to an acceptable level. Indeed, some evid ence
suggests chat such boots may acrually worsen the severity of leg and groin injuries when stepping on a
PMN. Further evidence from study and independent
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